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Article
Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts:
Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a
"Global Warming Solution" in California
RANDALL S. ABATE
The battle against climate change and its impacts in the United States must be
waged on many fronts and requires many weapons. Until the federal government
provides a comprehensive and mandatory legislative response to the climate
change problem, gap-filling efforts such as regional, state, and local legislative
initiatives and climate change litigation will be essential to achieve some progress
in the ongoing challenge to combat the causes and effects of climate change. This
Article focuses on one of those gap-filling efforts: public nuisance suits against
power companies and automobile manufacturers for the climate change impacts
caused by emissions from those entities. Part 11 of this Article discusses the
origins of public nuisance doctrine and the evolution of public nuisance claims as
a vehicle for environmental litigation. Part 11I examines climate change as a new
context for public nuisance litigation. It considers the political question doctrine
as a possible obstacle to public nuisance claims for climate change impacts
through an exploration of recent case law, culminating with the district court
decision in California v. General Motors. Part IV analyzes preemption arguments
and state law public nuisance arguments raised in California v. General Motors.
Part V evaluates legal and policy arguments that maintain that public nuisance
claims for climate change impacts may be an improper expansion of public
nuisance doctrine. The Article concludes, contrary to the district court's
conclusion in California v. General Motors, that California's strategy in seeking
damages rather than injunctive relief in this case avoids possible political question
and preemption pitfalls and is an appropriate and viable avenue for future public
nuisance claims seeking recovery for climate change impacts.
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Automobile Emissions and Climate Change Impacts:
Employing Public Nuisance Doctrine as Part of a
"Global Warming Solution" in California
RANDALL S. ABATE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases "have
increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750. '
According to a report released on February 5, 2007 by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), "[w]arming of the
climate system is unequivocal, 2  and is very likely 3 attributable to
anthropogenic influences, namely, the release of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
into the atmosphere.4 These gases trap solar heat in the atmosphere that
would otherwise radiate away. 5 Consequently, the global average surface
temperature has risen 0.76 degrees Celsius since the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution.6
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency "does not dispute the
existence of a causal connection between man-made greenhouse gas
* Assistant Professor of Law, Florida Coastal School of Law. The author gratefully acknowledges
the assistance of Kelley Jancaitis, Masahiro Takeda, Aneta Mincheva, and H. French Brown, IV in
preparing this Article.
1 WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL
ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS 2 (S. Solomon et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2007), available at http://ipcc-
wgl .ucar.edu/wgl/Report/AR4WGIPrintSPM.pdf [hereinafter IPCC FAR WGI]. Although some
climate variability is normal, natural forces alone cannot explain the global warming experienced in the
second half of the 20th century. Id. at 10. Between 1970 and 2004 alone, emissions of carbon dioxide
increased 80%. WORKING GROUP HI TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: MITIGATION, SUMMARY
FOR POLICYMAKERS 3 (B. Metz et al. eds., Cambridge University Press 2007), available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/SPM040507.pdf [hereinafter IPCC FAR WGIII].
2 IPCC FAR WGI, supra note 1, at 5.
3 Working Group I of the IPCC uses the following terms to indicate the likelihood of a particular
outcome or result: "Virtually certain > 99% probability of occurrence, Extremely likely > 95%, Very
likely > 90%, Likely > 66%, More likely than not > 50%, Unlikely < 33%, Very unlikely < 10%,
Extremely unlikely < 5%." Id. at 3 n.6.
4 Id. at 10 ("The observed widespread warming of the atmosphere and ocean, together with ice
mass loss, support the conclusion that it is extremely unlikely that global climate change of the past
[fifty] years can be explained without external forcing, and very likely that it is not due to known
natural causes alone.").
5 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1446 (2007) ("[Wlhen carbon dioxide is released
into the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse, trapping solar energy and retarding the
escape of the reflected heat.").
6 IPCC FAR WGI, supra note 1, at 5.
emissions and global warming."7  The harms associated with global
climate change are both "serious" and "well-recognized," and result in loss
of glaciers, increased flooding risks, and accelerated sea level rise.8
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court recently recognized that the continued
release of unregulated greenhouse gas emissions creates a risk of harm that
is both "actual" and "imminent." 9
Unlike virtually all major industrialized nations, the United States is
not a party to the Kyoto Protocol,' ° and has not enacted mandatory federal
GHG emissions reduction legislation to regulate the causes of climate
change." In the absence of such mandatory federal regulation, voluntary
measures have been introduced at the federal level and several regional,
state, and local initiatives have been implemented to combat these types of
emissions.' 3 These piecemeal measures are a step in the right direction but
are not nearly enough to address the problems posed by climate change in
the United States.'
4
7 Massachusetts, 1275 S. Ct. at 1457.
'Id. at 1455.
91Id
'0 The United States' position on climate change is unique among major industrialized nations.
As of this writing, Australia is the only other major industrialized nation that is not a party to the Kyoto
Protocol. Kyoto Protocol: Status of Ratification, Oct. 23, 2007, http://unfccc.int/files/
essential background/kyotoprotocol/status of ratification/application/pdf/kpstats.pdf.
1The McCain/Lieberman Climate Stewardship Act sought to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to
2000 levels by 2010. S. 139, 108th Cong. § 316 (2003). The Act was defeated in the Senate by a vote
of 55-43 in October 2003. 149 CONG. REC. S13598 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2003). The U.S. government
currently supports voluntary measures to address climate change. See Press Release, White House,
Office of the Press Secretary, Climate Change Fact Sheet (May 18, 2005), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/46741.htm (detailing the Bush Administration's climate change
policy). At least four bills addressing climate change have been introduced in Congress in 2007 as of
this writing. E.g., Climate Stewardship Act of 2007, H.R. 620, 110th Cong. (2007) ("To accelerate the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States by establishing a market-driven system of
greenhouse gas tradeable allowances that will limit greenhouse gas emissions in the United States,
reduce dependence upon foreign oil, and ensure benefits to consumers from the trading in such
allowances .. "); Global Warming Pollution Reduction Act, S. 309, 110th Cong. (2007) ("To amend
the Clean Air Act to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide ...."); Global Warming Reduction Act of
2007, S. 485, 110th Cong. (2007) ("To amend the Clean Air Act to establish an economy-wide global
warming pollution emission cap-and-trade program to assist the economy in transitioning to new clean
energy technologies, to protect employees and affected communities, to protect companies and
consumers from significant increases in energy costs ...."); Safe Climate Act of 2007, H.R. 1590,
110th Cong. (2007) ("To reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect the climate.").
12 The Supreme Court recently described President George W. Bush's "comprehensive approach"
to climate change as involving "additional support for technological innovation, the creation of
nonregulatory programs to encourage voluntary private-sector reductions in greenhouse gas emissions,
and further research on climate change-not actual regulation." Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1451
(emphasis added). Current U.S. climate change policy can be found in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE ET AL.,
USA ENERGY NEEDS, CLEAN DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/75455.pdf.
13 See Randall S. Abate, Kyoto or Not, Here We Come: The Promise and Perils of the Piecemeal
Approach to Climate Change Regulation in the United States, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 369,
373-85 (2006) (detailing the federal, state, regional, and local initiatives that have been enacted in the
United States to combat climate change).
14 Id. at 373.
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California was not the first state to enact GHG emissions reduction
legislation;' 5 however, its Global Warming Solutions Act 16 is the most
ambitious and highly publicized state initiative in the nation. The Act
seeks to reduce emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.17  It is the first
enforceable state law aimed at reducing major industry GHG emissions
that applies penalties for noncompliance.18 The Act creates a framework' 9
for the soon-to-be developed regulatory system by establishing a timeline
for completing the necessary components of the system.20
Even though the Global Warming Solutions Act is much broader and
more proactive than most other states' legislative responses to climate
change, it is not a panacea for the multi-faceted challenge that climate
change presents in California. There are still gaps that need to be filled in
California's response to climate change because the battle against climate
change and its impacts must be waged on many fronts and requires many
weapons. Until the federal government provides a comprehensive and
mandatory legislative response to the climate change problem, gap-filling
efforts will be essential to achieve some progress in the ongoing challenge
to combat the causes and effects of climate change.
Consequently, in the month before the ambitious and comprehensive
Global Warming Solutions Act was signed into law, the California
Attorney General's Office filed a public nuisance suit, California v.
General Motors Corp., against the six largest automobile manufacturers in
the nation.21  The suit sought damages for the impacts22 caused by the
15 In May 2003, Maine became the first state to enact GHG emission reduction legislation. ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 576 (West Supp. 2006).
16 On October 17, 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger signed Assembly Bill 32, better known as the
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE Div. 25.5 (West
Supp. 2007).
17 Id. § 38550. The Act shall remain in effect beyond 2020, unless repealed or amended and
allows for the creation of a Climate Action Team to be established by the governor. Id. § 38551.
18 Id. § 38580. The Act also provides for injunctive relief and penalties for "[a]ny violation of any
rule, regulation, order, emission limitation, emissions reduction measure, or other measure adopted by
the state board," and violations of such "shall be deemed to result in an emission of an air contaminant
for the purposes of the penalty provisions." Id. § 38580(b)(2).
19 Although the Act lays the foundation for an operative market-based regulatory program, the
language of the Act itself only sets forth the objectives and various deadlines for the development of
the program. However, one mechanism that the Act affirmatively creates is a transferable credit
"reward" system for early compliance. Id. § 38562(b)(3).
20 The Global Warming Solutions Act requires that the California Air Resource Board (CARB)
determine California's 1990 GHG emission level and adopt a GHG reporting and verification system
by January 1, 2008. Id. §§ 38550, 38570(c). By January 1, 2010, CARB must adopt regulations to
implement the measures published by June 30, 2007. Id. § 38560.5. By January 1, 2011, CARB must
adopt greenhouse gas emission limits and emission reduction measures that can become operable by
January I, 2012. Id.
§ 38562(a).
2 Complaint for Damages and Equitable Relief at 15, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-
05755 MJJ (N.D. Cal. filed Sept. 20, 2006); California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, slip
op. at I (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
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automobile industry's carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to the
climate change problem in California.23 The automakers produce vehicles
that annually emit over 289 million metric tons of carbon dioxide in the
United States.24 This amount constitutes approximately nine percent of
human-generated carbon dioxide emissions in the United States and over
thirty percent in California. 25 These vehicle emissions have contributed to
climate change, which has greatly harmed California.26
California's complaint asserted that the state had already taken action
to remedy problems resulting from global warming and was spending
millions of dollars to study, plan for, monitor, and respond to impacts that
had already occurred because of climate change and other impacts that are
likely or certain to occur.27 California has also been harmed as the winter
average temperatures in the Sierra Nevada region have risen by almost four
degrees Fahrenheit during the second half of the twentieth century, which
has reduced the snow pack.28 A vital water storage and supply system for
the state, this snow pack holds approximately thirty-five percent of the
state's water.29 The increased temperatures cause the snow pack to melt
earlier, which results in an increased risk of floods.3 ° California has
already spent and continues to spend millions of dollars to plan for and
monitor changes as well as make changes to the infrastructure in order to
address such anticipated occurrences as coastal and beach erosion,
increasing ozone pollution, and water supply issues created by the
intrusion of seawater into the Sacramento Bay-Delta drinking water
supplies.31 The State also alleged that significant expenditures had already
22 Global warming impacts affect California in a variety of ways. The California Global
Warming Solutions Act of 2006 identifies global warming as a serious threat to the state economy, its
natural resources, and the public health. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a) (West Supp. 2007).
Specifically, it recognizes that global warming has the potential to affect air quality, water quality and
supply, raise sea level, damage commercial and residential interests, damage marine ecosystems and
the natural environment, and cause an increase in the incidence of infectious diseases. Id. These
impacts in turn will be detrimental to the state's agricultural, wine, tourist, skiing, and
recreation/commercial fishing industries. Id. § 38501(b).
23 The transportation sector is the fastest growing area of carbon dioxide emissions, and half of all
greenhouse gas output within the transportation sector comes from cars. ALEXANDER GILLESPIE,
CLIMATE CHANGE, OZONE DEPLETION AND AnR POLLUTION: LEGAL COMMENTARIES WITH POLICY
AND SCIENCE CONSIDERATIONS 42-43 (2006). Globally the transportation sector alone consumes 27%
of the nation's commercial energy. Id. at 43. Furthermore, the United States produces 6% of
worldwide carbon dioxide emissions. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1457 (2007)
("Considering just emissions from the transportation
sector . . . the United States would still rank as the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the
world.").
24 Complaint, supra note 21, at 2.
25 Id.
26 id.
2 7 Id. at 2-3.
2 1Id. at 10.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 10-1I.
' Id. at 10.
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been made responding to impacts to endangered or threatened wildlife, as
well as monitoring for future problems that will arise from the effects of
global warming.32
Climate change also accelerates sea level rise, which increases erosion
along California's approximately 1075 miles of coastline.33 Sea level rise
also increases the risk of salt infiltration to the fresh water of the
Sacramento Bay-Delta.34 The state has, suffered damage from storm
surges, beach closures, and natural resource degradation.35 Climate change
has also had severe health impacts on the people of California as extreme
heat events increase in frequency, duration, and intensity.36
In seeking public nuisance damages under either federal common law3
7
or the state's public nuisance law, California asserted that it was not asking
the court to find a comprehensive solution to climate change. 38  Rather,
California maintained that it was merely asking the court to apply the facts
of this case to determine if the state should recover for the unreasonable
harm caused by the automakers' vehicle emissions.39
The defendant automakers asserted that the federal court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction and that the state's action failed to state a claim. 40 The
automakers contended that the case is non-justiciable under the political
question doctrine. 41  The automakers further contended that there is no
federal common law for the "nuisance of global warming" and that the
claim is precluded under California law.42 Finally, the automakers alleged
that the Clean Air Act (CAA) 43 and the Energy Policy Conservation Act
(EPCA)44 preempt any claim for harm resulting from global warming.45
In response, California asserted that the federal common law of
nuisance has existed since Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,46 and that
courts are well suited to decide interstate nuisance cases. The complaint
32 Id. at 2-3.
33 Id. at 11.
34 id.
35 Id.
6 Id. at 12.
37 Federal common law is grounded in the Constitution's grant of original jurisdiction to the
Supreme Court for controversies between two or more states, and between a state and the citizens of
another state, and has been invoked to resolve conflicts over interstate pollution. Benjamin P. Harper,
Note, Climate Change Litigation: The Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance and Federalism
Concerns, 40 GA. L. REV. 661, 663-65 (2006).
38 Complaint, supra note 21, at 14.39 1d. at 12, 14.
40 Defendant's Supplemental Brief Re: Massachusetts v. EPA at 3 n.2, California v. Gen. Motors
Corp., No. C06-05755MJJ (N.D. Cal. filed Apr. 3, 2007).
41 Id. at 1-3.
42 Id. at 3.
43 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 74 01-767 lg (Westlaw 2007).
44 Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6422 (Westlaw 2007).
45 Defendant's Supplemental Brief, supra note 40, at 1, 3-4.46 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237-39 (1907).
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asserted two causes of action, the first of which alleged a violation of the
federal common law of public nuisance.47 The state alleged that the
defendants have knowingly created and contributed to global warming, a
public nuisance, by substantially and unreasonably interfering with the
public rights of the citizens of California in emitting carbon dioxide and
other GHGs.48 The state stressed that although the emission of carbon
dioxide is interstate in nature, there have been "specific identifiable
impacts in California. ' 49 The second cause of action relied on state public
nuisance law, and asserted that the defendants are liable under California
Civil Code § 3479 et seq. and California Code Civil Procedure § 731 50
Rather than seek injunctive relief, the plaintiffs in California v.
General Motors sought damages as a way to avoid dismissal on political
question grounds-a fate that befell the plaintiff in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co., a similar public nuisance case against power
plants filed just one year prior to California v. General Motors.5' On
September 17, 2007, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California disregarded this potentially viable distinction and dismissed
California's public nuisance claims on political question grounds. 2
Part II of this Article discusses the origins of public nuisance doctrine
and the evolution of public nuisance claims as a vehicle for environmental
litigation. Part III examines climate change as a new context for public
nuisance litigation. It considers the parameters of the political question
doctrine as a possible obstacle to public nuisance claims for climate change
impacts through an exploration of Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Co., Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.,53 and California v.
General Motors. Part IV analyzes preemption arguments and state law
public nuisance arguments that the court in California v. General Motors
did not reach because it dismissed the case on political question grounds.
Part V evaluates legal and policy arguments that maintain that public
nuisance claims for climate change impacts may be an improper expansion
of public nuisance doctrine. The Article concludes, contrary to the district
court's conclusion in California v. General Motors, that California's
47 Complaint, supra note 21, at 12-13.48 1d. at 12.49 1d. at 12-13.
'
0 Id. at 13-14. The California Civil Code defines a nuisance as "anything which is injurious to
health ...or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable
enjoyment of life or property .. " Id. at 14. California law further defines public nuisance as "one
which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal."
Id
s Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
52 California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, slip op. at 5-6, 15-16 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
For a full discussion of this decision, see infra Part III.C.
53 Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 680-81, 688-89 (E.D. La.
2006).
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strategy in seeking damages rather than injunctive relief in California v.
General Motors avoids possible political question and preemption pitfalls
and is an appropriate and viable avenue for future public nuisance claims
for climate change impacts.
II. PUBLIC NUISANCE: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
A. Public Nuisance Defined
Originating in the twelfth century, nuisance principles form the basis
of modem environmental statutes.54 At first only private nuisance was
recognized; then, in the sixteenth century, courts also recognized public
nuisance.5 5 In California v. General Motors, California relies on a public
nuisance theory which provides a remedy for "an unreasonable interference
with a right common to the general public. 56 Unreasonable interferences
include significant interference with the public's health,57 safety,58 peace,59
comfort,60 and morals.6 '
In determining the unreasonableness of the interference, courts
consider: (1) the duration and effect of the conduct, (2) the actor's state of
mind, and (3) whether a statute or other law makes the conduct unlawful.
62
54 See Cox v. Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 289 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The nuisance action originated in the
twelfth century.").
55 Id.
56 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979). Some states define it even more
narrowly-as "an interference with either a public or a private interest in land." 3 ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW PRACTICE GUIDE § 16.02 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007). Other states define it more broadly as
any annoyance to the community. See, e.g., Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So.2d 1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001)
(explaining "a public nuisance may be classified as something that causes 'any annoyance to the
community or harm to public health') (citation omitted).
57 See, e.g., Donley v. Boettcher, 255 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Wis. 1977) (finding a city can
appropriately take action against a building declared to be a public nuisance because of its unfitness for
human habitation, occupancy, or use).
5 See, e.g., Pucci v. Algiere, 261 A.2d 1, 10 (R.I. 1970) (affirming the lower court's finding that a
building whose floors, foundation, roof, and other parts were unsafe constituted a common-law
nuisance).
59 See, e.g., State v. Turner, 18 S.E.2d 372, 375 (S.C. 1942) (holding that a person is liable for
public nuisance when the person knowingly allows the noise and profanity of drunken crowds to
violate public peace).
60 See, e.g., Karpisek v. Cather & Sons Constr., Inc., 117 N.W.2d 322, 327 (Neb. 1962) (holding
that an asphalt plant constitutes a public nuisance by generating dust carried onto private property when
the private property owners suffered harm different from that suffered by the general public).
61 See, e.g., Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 168 (I11. 982) (holding that "a
common law nuisance action may be maintained against a theater operator presenting live exhibitions
that are obscene under our criminal law of obscenity"); Chicago v. Cecola, 389 N.E.2d 526, 528 (I11.
1979) (holding that a massage parlor offering services constituting prostitution is a public nuisance).
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2) (1979); see also Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783
So.2d 1029, 1036 (Fla. 2001) (stating public nuisances may exist even if the actor complies with
pollution laws); New York v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 40, 44-45 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (finding unreasonable interference existed where the actor's conduct lasted for decades and
recurred on a weekly basis, and dismissing the conduct's compliance with zoning ordinances as well as
its priority of occupation as immaterial).
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Liability rests on a showing of unreasonable interference or injury, not
unreasonable conduct. Therefore, recovery for public nuisance is possible
even if the conduct is otherwise non-tortious.63 Although the actor's state
of mind is one factor in the unreasonableness analysis,64 a plaintiff is not
required to prove that the actor was negligent; 65 instead, he must establish
proof of unreasonable interference with a public right.66 Unreasonable
interferences must cause "material" injuries, and do not include "mere
trifles and slight indecencies.
Public nuisance must affect the public's common rights, as opposed to
merely inflicting an injury to a large number of people's private rights.68
One such common right is the enjoyment of the environment.69 In the
environmental context, public nuisance claims have been used to abate air
pollution,7° water pollution,7' hazardous waste disposal,72 and excessive
noise.73
63 See, e.g., Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1247 (R.I. 1982) (holding that defendant can recover
for public nuisance even when the conduct alleged does not qualify as a tort).
6 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(2)(c) (1979) (stating that whether the actor
knows, or has reason to know, that his or her conduct has a significant effect on a public right, is a
factor in determining whether the interference is unreasonable).
65 Wood, 443 A.2d at 1249 (holding that "negligence is not a necessary element of a nuisance case
involving contamination of public or private waters by pollutants percolating through the soil and
traveling underground routes").
66 See County of Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, 76 F.3d 42, 45-47 (2d Cir. 1996) (focusing
on the presumed reasonableness of growing trees by landowners in dismissing a county's public
nuisance suit alleging the trees interfered with the county's airport operations); see also Waterloo Stock
Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d at 43 (stating that to determine unreasonableness, courts look at the
facts of each case under a totality of the circumstances approach that includes factors like "location,
surroundings, nature of the use, extent and frequency of the injury, and the effect on the enjoyment of
life, health and property").
67 See Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d at 44 ("This is not a case where the
populous is grumbling about mere trifles and slight indecencies. . . . Instead this is a completely
unreasonable use of Defendant's premises to the material injury of his neighbor's premises and his
person, and need not be suffered any longer.").6 8 
Id. at 43-44.
69 See David A. Grossman, Warming Up to a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change
Litigation, 28 COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 53 (2003) ("If, however, pollution prevents the use of a public
beach or kills the fish in a navigable stream and thus potentially affects all members of the community,
it impinges on a public right and can be characterized as a public nuisance. The enjoyment of the
natural environment would seem to constitute such a public right.").
70 See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238-39 (1907) (enjoining the discharge of
sulphur dioxide that constituted a nuisance as it threatened harm to forests and plants and even public
health).
71 See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 106 (1972) (explaining how water pollution claims
have been brought under a public nuisance theory).
72 See Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1248 (R.I. 1982) (finding private and public nuisance
existed where chemical dump site caused substantial injury to neighbors and threatened "to cause
incalculable damage to the general public").
73 See New York v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 40, 43-45 (Sup. Ct. 1978)
(holding that the operation of a stock car raceway constitutes a public nuisance because of the
cumulative effect of danger, noise, and dust that it produces).
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Public nuisance actions may be brought by the government74 or by
private persons.75 The number of affected persons does not need to be very
high as long as the unreasonable interference as a whole constitutes a
wrong to the public at large.76 One way to satisfy this requirement is by
showing that the location and manner of operation affect many different
people who are continuously or temporarily in the area.7 7 Private persons
generally must have suffered harm different in kind from the harm suffered
by the general public to be able to bring a suit for public nuisance;
78
however, in some jurisdictions a harm different in kind may not be
required as long as the public nuisance is substantial.79
Plaintiffs in nuisance actions may seek as a remedy damages,
injunctions, or both.80  Damages are awarded when the harm caused is
significant and unreasonable despite the utility of the actor's conduct.8 '
Damages are available in both temporary and permanent nuisance cases.82
Where the nuisance is temporary, the damages recoverable are the
reduction in value of the property in addition to any special damages.83
Where the nuisance is permanent, the damages recoverable are the
permanent reduction in value of the property in addition to any special
damages. 84 Where the government sues for damages, it must show it
suffered a pecuniary loss as a property owner.8 5
Injunctions are available when there is no adequate remedy at law. 86
74 See Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co., 362 N.E.2d 968, 971 (N.Y. 1977) ("A public, or
as sometimes termed a common, nuisance is an offense against the State and is subject to abatement or
prosecution on application of the proper governmental agency."); see also County of Westchester v.
Town of Greenwich, 76 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (dismissing a county's public nuisance suit against
landowners whose trees allegedly interfered with the county's airport operations).
75 See Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 315 n.13 (3d Cir. 1985) (stating that
a private person may bring a public nuisance claim if the harm suffered was of a different kind than the
one suffered by the general public); Copart Indus., Inc., 362 N.E.2d at 971 (stating private persons may
bring public nuisance actions if the injury suffered is "special").
76 Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d at 44.
77 Id.
7' Philadelphia Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 315 n.13; see also Leo v. Gen. Elec. Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d
844, 845-47 (App. Div. 1989) (holding commercial fishermen have standing on a public nuisance
claim seeking monetary and injunctive relief against a manufacturer whose discharge of pollutants into
public waters affected fishermen's ability to earn a livelihood because they have suffered "peculiar"
harm due to the fact that "diminution or loss or livelihood is not suffered by every person who fishes"
there).
79 See United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 966-67 (W.D.N.Y.
1989) (ruling in favor of plaintiffs, public and private persons, the court found a public nuisance exists
when an actor engages in "an abnormally dangerous activity" by disposing hazardous waste).
so Cox v. Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291 (5th Cir. 2001).
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. i (1979).
82 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 56, § 16.02[4][a].
83 Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1125 (7th Cir. 1976).
84 Rebel v. Big Tarkio Drainage Dist., 602 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), overruled on
other grounds by Frank v. Envtl. Sanitation Mgmt., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985).
85 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 56, § 16.02[4][a].
86 Stockdale v. Agrico Chem. Co., 340 F. Supp. 244, 260 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Pate v. Martin, 614
S.W.2d 46, 48-49 (Tenn. 1981).
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They are granted when the actor's conduct is so unreasonable that it must
cease.87  Generally, in deciding whether to enjoin a nuisance, courts
consider the plaintiffs injury, the defendant's expense in abating the
nuisance and mitigation efforts, and the utility of the activity.88 However,
where the nuisance is permanent, injunctive relief becomes impracticable.89
Defenses in nuisance actions include transfer of ownership, coming to
the nuisance, and statute of limitations.9" In general, defendants are liable
for maintaining or creating a nuisance even after selling the property to
another. 9' When the current owner knew or should have known of the
nuisance when buying the property, he or she may be liable for
maintaining it.92 Some defendants would also argue the plaintiff came to
the nuisance; however, in most cases this is just one factor the courts
consider rather than a total defense.9 3 The statute of limitations can be
used as a defense because nuisance is a tort.94 In continuing nuisance
jurisdictions, each separate action is deemed to trigger the statute. 95
B. Public Nuisance as a Vehicle for Environmental Litigation
Although "' [t]he deepest doctrinal roots of modem environmental law
are found in principles of nuisance,"'' 96 the Supreme Court has consistently
rejected public nuisance cases involving interstate water pollution, both
before and after the enactment of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Public
nuisance claims in the air pollution context are potentially more viable than
87 Grossman, supra note 69, at 58.
88 3 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 56, § 16.02[4][a].
89 id.
90 Other potential defenses include laches, a prescriptive right to maintain a nuisance, and non-
liability for discretionary actions of the government. See Shea Homes Ltd. P'ship v. United States, 397
F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1199-1201 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (dismissing nuisance and trespass claims against the
U.S. government for damages from methane gas because the government's efforts to control methane
gas emissions from landfill were discretionary); Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 319 A.2d
871, 883-84 (Pa. 1974) (holding that an action against stream polluters was not barred by laches, nor
did the polluters obtain a prescriptive right to pollute as against the Commonwealth).
91 State v. Ole Olsen, Ltd., 324 N.E.2d 886, 886 (N.Y. 1975).
92 See State v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1051 (2d Cir. 1985) (determining a landowner
responsible because he "purchased [the land] with knowledge of its condition-indeed of the
approximate cost of cleaning it up-and with an opportunity to clean up the site"); see also Starr v.
Comm'r of Envtl. Prot., 627 A.2d 1296, 1314 (Conn. 1993) (determining landowners liable for
nuisances on their properties, even those who, "without fault of their own, find themselves the owners
of polluted real estate without their having created or caused the contamination"), superseded by
statute, An Act Establishing an Innocent Landowner Defense in Pollution Cases, 1993 Conn. Acts
1420 (Reg. Sess.), as recognized in 675 A.2d 430, 434-35 (Conn. 1996).
93 McQuade v. Tucson Tiller Apts., Ltd., 543 P.2d 150, 153 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); see also
Patrick v. Sharon Steel Corp., 549 F. Supp. 1259, 1267-68 (N.D. W. Va. 1982) (holding that West
Virginia, like many other jurisdictions, has "rejected the doctrine of coming to the nuisance as a
defense" because it is out of place in modem society and it goes against public policy).
9' Lynn Mining Co. v. Kelly, 394 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965).
95 Carpenter v. Texaco, 646 N.E.2d 398, 399-400 (Mass. 1995).
96 Cox v. Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
HANDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.1 (1977)).
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in the water pollution context, even following the enactment of the CAA.
This is due to the favorable precedent in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,
and also because the CAA's regulatory scheme is not as comprehensive as
the CWA's regulatory framework.
1. Interstate Water Pollution
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the U.S. Supreme Court
has repeatedly denied public nuisance claims involving interstate water
pollution. This trend started with Missouri v. Illinois,97 where the court
refused to enjoin the discharge of Chicago's sewage, deemed a nuisance,
into the Mississippi River through an artificial channel.98 Missouri had
alleged that Chicago's sewage discharge increased the number of deaths
from typhoid fever in Missouri. 99 The court observed that the plaintiffs
case depended on the inferences that typhoid fever has significantly
increased since the discharge and that the bacillus survived the journey to
St. Louis.100 Concluding that the deaths from typhoid fever in St. Louis
could have been caused by another source and not necessarily by the
typhoid bacillus, the court dismissed the suit because the evidence was
conflicting as to whether the bacillus survived the journey to St. Louis.' 0'
In the early interstate water pollution cases, the Supreme Court relied
on the inadequacy of the judiciary as a forum to resolve such disputes. For
example, in 1921, the Supreme Court dismissed a common law public
nuisance claim based on water pollution in a New York suit seeking a
permanent injunction against New Jersey for its sewage discharge. 0 2 The
court considered the evidence "much too meager and indefinite to be
seriously considered as ground for an injunction," especially given that a
proposal was in place to treat the new sewage before it was discharged.1
0 3
The court concluded that the sewage would not constitute a public
nuisance because the evidence was not convincing that it would cause
deposits on the water's surface, offensive odors, or serious pollution.
14
The court emphasized that "the grave problem of sewage disposal ... is
one more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study and by
conference and mutual concession on the part of representatives of the
States ... than by proceedings in any court.
°105
Similarly, the Supreme Court had also noted that the problem of
97 Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
9' Id. at 525-26.
99 Idat 522-23.
1O0Id
-1 Id. at 525-26.
102 New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 312-13 (1921).
1




' Id. at 313.
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interstate pollution, no matter how simple the case may be, presents "an
extremely awkward vehicle [for the court] to manage.' ' 10 6  In Ohio v.
Wyandotte Chemical Corp., the court declined to exercise original
jurisdiction in a suit brought by Ohio against out-of-state corporations that
allegedly created a nuisance by dumping mercury in Lake Erie. 10 7 The
court concluded that it would exercise its original jurisdiction on issues of
federal law, particularly those requiring appellate review, but not for
"noisome, vexatious, or unfamiliar tasks."'0'  The court reasoned that
because mercury was not the only pollutant in the Lake, the case raised
novel scientific factual issues, and there were many governmental agencies
already dealing with those issues. 109
In the modem era of interstate water pollution cases, the Supreme
Court has relied on preemption under the CWA as a basis for denying
public nuisance claims. For example, in 1981, the court in Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association"
dismissed the respondents' federal common law nuisance claims against
various government entities of Middlesex."' The respondents alleged that
the petitioners had discharged sewage and other waste into the Hudson
River and New York Harbor, polluting the Atlantic Ocean and thereby,
"causing the 'collapse of the fishing, clamming and lobster industries., ' 1, 2
The court held that "the federal common law of nuisance has been fully
pre-empted in the area of ocean pollution" ' 13 by statute." 4
2. Interstate Air Pollution
There are several public nuisance cases involving air pollution that
provide a significant portion of the foundation for evaluating the viability
of public nuisance claims for climate change impacts. The first and
perhaps most significant of these cases is Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., where in 1907 the Supreme Court ruled in favor of a public nuisance
106 Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 504 (1972).
'
07 d. at 494.
'0' Id. at 498-99.
'
09 Id. at 503-05.
110 Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
... Id. at 22.
12 Id. at 4-5 (quoting Complaint at 39, App. 26a, Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981)).
"'Id. at 11.
14 The Court referred to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1387 (Westlaw 2007) and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1401-45 (Westlaw 2007). Middlesex County Sewerage Auth., 453 U.S. at 22. The Court
explained "there is no reason to suppose that the pre-emptive effect of the FWPCA is any less when
pollution of coastal waters is at issue." Id. Six years later, the Supreme Court similarly concluded that
the CWA preempted Vermont nuisance law from applying to a New York point source. Int'l Paper Co.
v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 501 (1987). For further discussion, see infra Part III.A.
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plaintiff in an interstate air pollution case." 5 Seeking injunctive relief, the
State of Georgia commenced an action in its quasi-sovereign capacity
against Tennessee's copper companies that allegedly discharged sulfur
dioxide in the air, harming Georgia's forests, crops, and orchards." 6 The
court noted:
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of a
sovereign that the air over its territory should not be polluted
on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas, that the forests on its
mountains, be they better or worse, and whatever domestic
destruction they have suffered, should not be further
destroyed or threatened by the act of persons beyond its
control, that the crops and orchards on its hills should not be
endangered from the same source. 17
In granting the injunction, the court noted the magnitude of the
pollution was not in dispute as it considerably threatened harm "to the
forests and vegetable life, if not to health, within the plaintiff State.""'
Nevertheless, the court allowed the companies a reasonable amount of time
to abate the pollution before issuing the injunction." 9 California relies
heavily on this landmark case in framing its theory of the case in
California v. General Motors.120
In contrast, in 1972, the Supreme Court in Washington v. General
Motors Corp. refused to exercise its original jurisdiction, 2 noting that
federal district courts are better equipped to handle the air pollution
claims. 122  In this case, eighteen states sued the nation's four major
automobile manufacturers alleging conspiracy "to restrain the development
of motor vehicle air pollution control equipment.',13 The states sought an
injunction
requiring the defendants to undertake an accelerated program
of spending, research and development designed to produce a
fully effective pollution control device or devices and/or
pollution free engine at the earliest feasible date and also
ordering defendants to install effective pollution control
devices in all motor vehicles they manufactured during the
conspiracy and as standard equipment in all future motor
115 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907).
16 Id. at 236-38.
"' I. at 238.
18 Id at 238-39.
"9 Id. at 239.
120 See infra Parts III, IV.
121 Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
122 Id. at 116.
121Id. at Il1.
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vehicles which they manufacture. 124
Although recognizing that the case presented "important questions of
vital national importance" and that the court's power to hear the case could
not be disputed, it still refused to exercise jurisdiction. 25 Noting that air
pollution was "one of the most notorious types of public nuisance,"'' 26 the
court concluded that air pollution remedies "necessarily must be
considered in the context of localized situations" as geographical
characteristics are important in abating air pollution.1
27
Public nuisance air pollution claims have not been as successful since
Congress's enactment of the Clean Air Act (CAA). In 1981, in New
England Legal Foundation v. Costle, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal
of a federal common law claim of nuisance seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against the Long Island Lighting Company.128  The
company allegedly maintained a public nuisance by burning high sulfur
fuel. 29  Without deciding whether the CAA always preempts federal
common law nuisance claims alleging air pollution, the Second Circuit
based its decision on two factors. 30  First, the Second Circuit considered
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) express approval of the
conduct, especially since "the conduct sought to be enjoined implicates the
technically complex area of environmental law and where Congress has
vested administrative authority in a federal agency presumably having
significant technical expertise.' 13 1  The court noted that Congress had
decided that better regulation would result from a comprehensive statutory
program than "through ad hoc common law remedies."' 32  Second, the
court contemplated the availability of an adequate and more appropriate
remedy at law, namely a petition to the EPA for review of the interstate
effects of the alleged sulfate emission and further appeals, if necessary. 33
Because the alternative remedy existed, the court concluded that "a federal
common law remedy would be contrary to congressional intent."' 34
Four years later, in National Audubon Society v. Department of Water
& Power of Los Angeles, 135 the Ninth Circuit refused to recognize a federal
124 Id. at 112 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1
25 id,
126 1d. at 114.
127 id. at 114-16.
128 New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 33 (2d Cir. 1981).
129 1d. at 31.
130 Id. at 32-33.
... Id. at 33.132 id.
133 Id.
'34 Id. Similarly, the following year, in United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J.
1982), the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment dismissing the United States' federal common law nuisance claim seeking damages
for air pollution. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. at 700. For further discussion, see infra Part II.A.
135 Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of Water & Power of L.A., 869 F.2d 1196 (9th Cir. 1988).
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common law nuisance claim based on air pollution, noting that the case did
not involve "either the rights and obligations of the United States as
sovereign, or an interstate dispute making application of state law
inappropriate.' 36 The National Audubon Society sought an injunction to
restrain the defendant's diversion of four freshwater streams that flowed
naturally to Mono Lake, alleging that the diversion to Los Angeles
increased the salinity and ion concentration of Mono Lake. 137 The court
held that the federal common law nuisance claims for air and water
pollution were preempted by federal air and water quality statutes. 38 The
court further noted that the CAA authorized the EPA and the states to
remedy air pollution. 139 It concluded that there was not "a uniquely federal
interest," but rather that it was the states' responsibility to protect the
nation's air quality. 40 The court did not reach the issue of preemption by
the CAA because it concluded that no federal common law nuisance claim
for air pollution could be asserted based on the facts of the case.
14 1
Although public nuisance cases regarding interstate air pollution were
not significantly more successful than those involving interstate water
pollution, these air pollution cases asserting federal common law as the
basis for relief have left the door ajar to assert a successful public nuisance
claim for the interstate pollution involved in climate change. The
applicable cases limited their holdings to narrow factual contexts and
acknowledged that the CAA is not as comprehensive as the CWA in its
preemptive effect on the federal common law of interstate pollution.
42
III. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AS PUBLIC NUISANCE:
THE POLITICAL QUESTION HURDLE
While public nuisance cases in the air pollution context form a
foundation for the climate change impact cases that will be discussed in the
remaining parts of the Article, there is no federal common law for climate
change. This reality makes it even more challenging for plaintiffs to bring
successful public nuisance claims for climate change impacts. In addition,





3 Id. at 1200, 1202.
3
9 Id. at 1202.
'40 Id. at 1203.
141 Id. at 1205.
142 See Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972) (stating that while air
pollution is a nationally felt public nuisance, abatement measures should be state fostered to
accommodate the disparate needs of various cities); Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Dep't of Water & Power
of L.A., 869 F.2d 1196, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (stating that the Clean Air
Act not an all-encompassing program of pollution regulation comparable to the Clean Water Act);
New England Legal Found. v. Costle, 666 F.2d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 1981) (stating that the court would not
"reach the broad question of whether the Clean Air Act totally preempts federal common law nuisance
actions based on the emission of chemical pollutants into the air").
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the CAA and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA 43 present potential additional obstacles to the potentially viable
theory of public nuisance claims for climate change impacts.
Like other air pollution, defendants' GHG emissions that contribute to
global warming threaten the public's health, safety, comfort, and
convenience, and thus, can be deemed unreasonable. 44 In addition, global
warming has long-lasting effects that are foreseeable to the actors. 45 The
injuries asserted in global warming suits also implicate public rights. 146
For instance, the thawing of the permafrost in Alaska implicates public
rights by leading to forest damage, erosion, sinking of ground surface, and
more. 47 Although harm need not have occurred for recovery in a claim for
injunctive relief, 48 global warming plaintiffs often have already suffered
the harmful impacts of climate change.
149
The fundamental questions are (1) whether compensation for climate
change impacts should be handled by the judicial branch, as opposed to the
legislative or executive branches, and (2) whether climate change causes
and impacts should be addressed at the international level rather than under
a purely domestic regime and forum. These challenging questions trigger
the political question doctrine's potential applicability to this context. The
first public nuisance case filed to recover for climate change impacts,
Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., was dismissed on political
question grounds.' 50 The second public nuisance case for climate change
impacts, California v. General Motors, sought damages instead of
injunctive relief in an attempt to avoid political question doctrine concerns,
but suffered a similar fate at the hands of the political question doctrine.
A. Connecticut v. American Electric Power: Political Question Doctrine
and Injunctive Relief
In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., eight states 15 1 sued
five major power production companies in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York.'52 The states claimed that they represented
143 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
'44 See id. at 1455-56 ("The harms associated with climate change are serious and well
recognized."); Grossman, supra note 69, at 54 ("The second critical element of a public nuisance claim
is that the defendants' interference with the public right is unreasonable.").
145 Grossman, supra note 69, at 54.
'46 See id. at 53 ("The first critical element of the definition of public nuisance is 'a right common
to the general public."').
1
4 7
1 d. at 53-54.
148 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B cmt. i (1979).
149 Grossman, supra note 69, at 58.
150 Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 267, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
151 Connecticut, New York, Iowa, New Jersey, Vermont, Wisconsin, Rhode Island, and
California. Id. at 267.
152 American Electric Power Company, the Southern Company, Tennessee Valley Authority, Xcel
Energy Corporation, and Cinergy Corporation. Id
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the interests of more than seventy-seven million people and their related
environments. 153 The states brought suit on alternative grounds, alleging
both federal and state common law theories for the public nuisance of
global warming.
54
The states claimed that the defendant power companies were the five
largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States, collectively
emitting approximately 650 million tons of carbon dioxide annually, or one
quarter of the U.S. electric power sector's carbon dioxide emissions. 55
They also asserted that U.S. electric power plants emit ten percent of the
world's human activity carbon dioxide emissions. 5 6 The states claimed
that carbon dioxide emissions that contribute to climate change were
occurring. " The states sought an order (1) "holding each of the
Defendants jointly and severally liable for contributing to an ongoing
public nuisance, global warming," and (2) enjoining each of the
defendants' contribution to the public nuisance "by capping its emissions
of carbon dioxide and then reducing those emissions by a specified
percentage each year for at least a decade."'
' 58
The electric power companies contended that the states failed to state
an action for which relief could be granted because: (1) "there is no
recognized federal common law cause of action to abate [GHG]
emissions"; (2) separation of powers principles preclude the court from
adjudication; and (3) "Congress has displaced any federal common law
cause of action to address the issue of global warming."
'159
The defendants relied on the fact that Congress passed the Global
Change Research Act in 1990, which authorized federally funded climate
change research. 60 The defendants noted that while the United States is a
party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCC), 161 this treaty is non-binding. 162 The defendants further relied on
a series of congressional bills affirmatively barring the EPA from
1"l1d. at 268.
154 Id. at 267. Federal and state common law are mutually exclusive; federal common law applies
when important federal interests would be frustrated by the application of state law or to prevent
injustice from forum shopping likely to result if the applicable law to a controversy varies according to
the forum that decides it. Thomas W. Merrill, Global Warming as a Public Nuisance, 30 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 293, 310 (2005). See generally Matthew F. Pawa & Benjamin A. Krass, Global Warming as
a Public Nuisance: Connecticut v. American Electric Power, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 407 (2005)
(arguing that global warming is a public nuisance for which defendants could be held liable as
contributors).
i55 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 268.
156 Id.
157 Id.
1' Id. at 270.
159 Id.
160 Global Change Research Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2931-2938 (Westlaw 2007); Am. Elec. Power Co.,
406 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
161 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
162 Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 269-70.
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implementing the Kyoto Protocol. 63 Finally, the defendants relied on the
Bush administration's executive actions stressing that any judicial action
on the subject would have a negative impact on negotiations with
developing countries.'
64
In granting defendants' motion to dismiss, the Connecticut court relied
on the political question doctrine as articulated in Baker v. Carr.'65 Baker
set forth six independent circumstances that present non-justiciable
political questions 66  They are: (1) "a textually demonstrable
constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department;" (2) "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it;" (3) "the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;" (4)
"the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government;"
(5) "an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision
already made;" or (6) "the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question."
' 67
The court focused on the third Baker situation-the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion. The court concluded that without an initial policy
decision from the elected branches of government-Congress and the
Executive-the court would be required, at a minimum, to:
(1) determine the appropriate level at which to cap the carbon
dioxide emissions of these Defendants; (2) determine the
appropriate percentage reduction to impose upon Defendants;
(3) create a schedule to implement those reductions; (4)
determine and balance the implications of such relief on the
United States' ongoing negotiations with other nations
concerning global climate change; (5) assess and measure
available alternative energy resources; and (6) determine and
balance the implications of such relief on the United States
energy sufficiency and thus its national security.16
163 Id. at 269.
'6 Id. at 270.
165 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). In Baker, the U.S. Supreme Court responded to the
plaintiff's allegations of equal protection violations by articulating six independent instances in which a
claim presents a non-justiciable political question. Id. The Court recently reaffirmed the landmark
decision's contribution to the political question doctrine in Vieth v. Jublierer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-78
(2004). For a discussion of the history and ramifications of the decision, see generally Guy-Uriel E.
Charles, Constitutional Pluralism and Democratic Politics: Reflections on the Interpretative Approach
of Baker v. Carr, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (2002).
6 Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
167 id.
'" Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F.Supp.2d at 272.
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The court stated that without an initial policy determination, a balancing of
these interests is impossible.
169
The Plaintiffs argued that their case was a "simple [public] nuisance
claim of the kind courts have adjudicated in the past;"'170 however, the
court disagreed, noting that in no prior pollution-as-public-nuisance cases
had a court been asked to opine on areas that "[touch] on so many areas of
national and international policy. 17 1 The court stated that "[t]he scope and
magnitude of the relief the Plaintiffs seek reveals the transcendently
legislative nature of this litigation. Plaintiffs ask this Court to cap carbon
dioxide emissions and mandate annual reductions of an as-yet-unspecified
percentage."' 172  The court was concerned with the complexity of these
initial policy determinations concerning climate change, including whether
the costs be spread across the entire electricity-generating industry or other
industries, and the implications for the economy, the nation's energy
independence, and national security.
173
The court also considered statements that had previously been issued
by the EPA.174 The EPA has been given administrative authority over the
complex areas of environmental law and has issued several statements
regarding the regulation of activities that possibly could be contributing to
global climate change. 75 For instance, the EPA recognizes that "[i]t is
hard to imagine any issue in the environmental area having greater
'economic and political significance' than regulation of activities that
might lead to global climate change."'' 76 The EPA further noted that "[t]he
issue of global climate change . . . has been discussed extensively during
the last three Presidential campaigns; it is the subject of debate and
negotiation in several international bodies; and numerous bills have been
introduced in Congress over the last 15 years to address the issue.' 7 7 The
EPA has also indicated that efforts undertaken unilaterally by the United
States to address carbon dioxide emissions could weaken efforts by the
federal governments to influence developing nations to limit GHGs in their
economies and changes in the global climate raise important foreign policy
issues which are "the President's prerogative to address."'
78
1
6 9 Id. at 272-73.




... ld. at 273.
175 Id.
176 Id. (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,922, 52,928 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
177 Id. (quoting Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at
52,928).




Therefore, Connecticut initially appears to dim the prospects for
California's ability to recover in California v. General Motors. Both cases
seek relief in the politically charged area of climate change regulation,
where no controlling precedent exists in federal common law and where
the political question doctrine stands as a difficult obstacle to obtaining
relief for climate change impacts. The opportunity to seek damages
instead of injunctive relief, however, offers a potential opportunity to avoid
these problems.
B. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co.: Political Question
Doctrine and Damages
Since Connecticut, at least one environmental public nuisance case
was not dismissed under the political question doctrine. In Barasich v.
Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 179 the court engaged in a thorough
discussion of the Baker test and held that tort actions, such as public
nuisance, do not present non-justiciable political questions.'80
In Barasich, a class of Louisiana landowners sued oil and gas pipeline
companies for eroding protective marshlands that inevitably led to greater
destruction of the plaintiff's land once hit by Hurricane Katrina.181 The
plaintiffs alleged that the oil and gas companies' destruction of protective
marshes constituted a public nuisance that specifically harmed the plaintiff
landowners. The companies moved to dismiss on the ground that the
claim was a non-justiciable political question.i8 3
The court reviewed the Baker test and stated that cases that seek
monetary relief are less likely to raise political questions because
injunctions are susceptible to problems when they have the potential to
force the judiciary to intrude into the decision-making domain of another
branch. 84  The court then distinguished Connecticut on the basis of the
relief sought. Because the plaintiffs in Barasich sought monetary relief,
the court would not be forced to make the policy determinations that the
injunction in the Connecticut case required. 85  The court dismissed the
third Baker situation by stating that when there are judicially manageable
179 Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006).
Id. at 684-85.
811d. at 678.
182 Id. at 678-80.
183 Id. at 680.
114 Id. at 685-86. But see Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1459-63 (2007) (requiring the
EPA to classify carbon dioxide as an "air pollutant" within the meaning of the CAA, not through the
Court's independent policy determination on the nature and importance of regulating GHGs, but in
accord with Congress' intent in enacting the CAA).
185 But see Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-436-LG-RHW, slip op. at I (S.D. Miss.
Aug. 30, 2007) (dismissing on political question grounds the Gulf Coast property owners' suit for
damages against companies whose emissions of greenhouse gases allegedly increased the strength of
Hurricane Katrina).
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standards to guide the court, such as in tort claims, an initial policy
determination is unnecessary.186  The court then grouped the last three
Baker situations together, and concluded that they only apply when another
branch of government has acted in an area in which judicial action could
create a conflict.
187
The distinction noted in Barasich between public nuisance cases
seeking damages as compared to cases seeking injunctive relief has
potentially profound implications for the future of public nuisance suits for
climate change impacts. Understanding why Connecticut failed provides
the foundation for understanding why California v. General Motors' public
nuisance suit should succeed.
C. California v. General Motors: Political Question Doctrine and
Damages Revisited
The door that the Barasich case opened for potential recovery of
damages in a public nuisance suit was, at least temporarily, slammed shut
in the Northern District of California's decision in California v. General
Motors.188 In this case, California filed suit alleging public nuisance under
both federal common law and California state statutes for the climate
change impacts caused by emissions from the automobile industry.' 89 The
defendants' motion to dismiss asserted four separate grounds for
dismissal. 190
First, the defendants contended that the issue was a political question
best left to the legislative and executive branches. 19' Climate change
policy is a question of both public and foreign policy involving complex
science with potential political, social, and economic consequences.
1 92
California asserted that no policy determinations were needed; the court
simply needed to apply the law of nuisance to the facts of the case.
93
The Northern District of California considered the six Baker factors,
194
focusing on the third factor regarding whether the court would be required
to make an initial policy decision in order to resolve the case. 95 The
defendants argued that meaningful reductions in GHGs would require a
186 Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 686-87.
187 Id. at 687; see also Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct. at 1459-63 (concluding that the Court could
undermine prior acts of Congress and the Executive Branch by forcing the EPA to regulate carbon
dioxide through new vehicle emissions standards when doing so as a matter of statutory interpretation).
188 California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17,
2007).
1'9 Id. at *'1-2.
'90 Id. at *2.
'9' Id. at *5.
192 Id.
193 id.
194 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
'95 Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at *6.
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"broad array" of coordinated legislation. 196 California claimed that its
damage had already been suffered and there was no need to wait for a
comprehensive resolution of climate change impacts by the federal
government. 197
Even though California sought only damages in its suit, the court held
that this case presented a political question. 198  As in Connecticut v.
American Electric Power Co., the court held that resolution of the case
would require an assessment of whether there was unreasonable
interference with a public right.199 The court determined that it would need
to balance the benefits of emissions reductions against the public interest in
advancing and preserving the economy, which would likely require the
court to create a quotient or standard to quantify damages to California.2 °°
The court further reasoned that the federal government's hesitation and
deliberate inaction with respect to climate change policy makes court
intervention even more inappropriate. 20 1 Because the issue is "still under
active consideration" by the legislative and executive branches,
202
interference by the judicial branch would undermine the political branch by
weakening the United States' efforts to persuade key developing countries
to lower the GHG-intensity of their economies.2 3
After examining Massachusetts v. EPA, the court in California v.
General Motors concluded that the authority to regulate GHGs lies with
the federal government. 204 By concluding that the plaintiffs had standing
to challenge the EPA in that case, the Supreme Court implicitly recognized
that states dissatisfied with national policy should advance their interest
through administrative channels. 20 5 Moreover, the court recognized that
the Clean Air Act (CAA) covers all air pollutants, including carbon
dioxide; therefore, the determination of reasonableness lies with the EPA
under the auspices of the CAA.
20 6
The court also found the first and second Baker factors persuasive in
its determination of non-justiciability.2 7  The defendant automobile
manufacturers argued that there is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment to the other branches in the area of climate change policy.2
0 8
The defendants relied on (1) Congress's authority over interstate
196 id
19 7 id.






203 Id. at *7.
214Id. at **10-12.
205 Id. at *11.
206 id.
207Id. at **13-16.
208 Gen. Motors Corp., 2007 WL 2726871, at **13-14.
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commerce, and (2) the power of the executive and legislative branches
over foreign policy.20 9  The court agreed with the defendants, noting
negative commerce implications where automakers, utility companies, and
other businesses would be exposed to additional tort liability simply for
operating lawfully within a given state.210 Moreover, in the area of foreign
policy, the court recognized the political branches' refusal to involve the
United States in the international global warming debate without
commitment from developing countries and the injustice in punishing
defendant automobile manufacturers for selling their product lawfully in
domestic and international markets.2 '
The defendants also claimed that there was a lack of judicially
manageable standards to guide the court in reaching a decision.
21 2
California, however, asserted that the legal framework for federal common
law nuisance is well-established through transboundary pollution cases."'
The court concluded that these transboundary cases were distinguishable
from the present instance because: (1) the plaintiffs in those cases sought
equitable remedies, not money damages, so they provide no guidance to
the court in determining an appropriate amount for damage from pollution;
(2) the cases provide no standards for allocating fault or damages between
parties for damage from GHG emissions; (3) those cases do not implicate
as many national and international policy issues; (4) transboundary
pollution cases were focused on local problems emanating from a single,
identifiable source; and (5) federal nuisance cases have been reserved for
cases where one state sues a company for nuisance when operating in
another state.2 14 In the present case, the defendants operate both within and
215
outside of the state of California, as well as in many foreign countries.
Based on these considerations, the court held that there was a lack of
judicially manageable standards.2t 6
Having determined that a non-justiciable political question existed, the
court declined to consider California's federal common law of interstate
pollution arguments.21 7 Moreover, the parties conceded that the court
cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction over California's state common
20 Id. at *13.
211 Id. at * 14.
212 Id.
213 Id. at *15 (citing Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (discharge of raw sewage
into Lake Michigan); New Jersey v. City of New York, 283 U.S. 473 (193 1) (diversion of water from
rivers); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923) (actions causing flooding); New York v. New
Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921) (discharge of sewage into New York Bay); Georgia v. Tennessee, 206 U.S.
230 (1907) (discharge of noxious gases)).2 14 id.
216 Id. at **15-16.
217 Id. at *16
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law claims when it does not have jurisdiction over the federal claim. 218
Thus, the Northern District of California dismissed the case, but allowed
the state law nuisance claim to be re-filed in California state court.
219
IV. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AS PUBLIC NUISANCE:
PREEMPTION AND STATE LAW ISSUES
The plaintiffs in both Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. and
California v. General Motors pled their cases in the alternative. In each
case, the plaintiffs asserted that federal common law applied and should
govern the outcome; however, if the court determined that federal common
law did not apply, the plaintiffs asserted that they were entitled to relief
under state common law.220  Equipped with the knowledge that seeking
injunctive relief was what doomed Connecticut's public nuisance claim, 221
the State of California sued six major automakers seeking money damages
for contributing to climate change.222 The critical difference between the
two cases was that the plaintiffs in Connecticut v. American Electric Power
Co. sought injunctive relief, whereas the state in California v. General
Motors sought damages. Although this distinction should have ensured
that California could avoid the political question concern that plagued the
plaintiffs in Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co., the Northern
District of California disagreed.223 Nevertheless, because the district court
dismissed the case on political question grounds, there are still important
issues that the district court did not reach regarding preemption issues
under the CAA and EPCA that may be addressed in a possible appeal of
the case to the Ninth Circuit. This Part of the Article will first review the
context of federal and state common law public nuisance claims and how
the preemption concern arises. It will then address the conflict preemption
and field preemption concerns at issue in California v. General Motors,
and conclude with a brief discussion of the state law arguments in the case.
218 Id.
220 Common law claims may be more advantageous than regulatory claims because they allow for
compensation to individual victims and can promote timely restoration of damaged natural resources
and polluted lands. Jason J. Czarnezki & Mark L. Thomsen, Advancing the Rebirth of Environmental
Common Law, 34 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007).
221 Ken Alex, Supervising Deputy Attorney General for the State of California, participated in the
filing of the Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. case and in drafting the California v. General
Motors complaint. In doing so, he relied on the opinion of the court in Connecticut v. American
Electric Power Co. in making decisions on how to plead California v. General Motors.
222 Complaint, supra note 21, at 3-5 (naming General Motors Corp., Toyota Motor North
America, Inc., Ford Motor Co., Honda North America, Inc., Chrysler Motors Corp., and Nissan North
America, Inc. as defendants).
223 For a full discussion of the court's discussion, see supra Part III.C.
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A. Federal Common Law and Preemption
There are three ways in which federal law can preempt state law.
22 4
First, express preemption exists when a federal law provides in express
terms that a particular state law is preempted.22 5 Second, implied or "field"
preemption exists where a federal law is so comprehensive that it creates a
reasonable inference that Congress intended to make the federal law
practically universal, leaving no room for the state regulation.226 Finally, a
federal law may preempt a state law when the state law conflicts with the
federal law by being "'an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress', 227 or by making compliance
with both the federal law and the state law physically impossible.228
Preemption is a potential issue in public nuisance claims because
229federal courts, unlike state courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction. In
1938, the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins declared,
"There is no federal general common law." 230 Therefore, because neither
the federal Constitution nor Congress has the authority to dictate what
common law rules the states should apply, the common law of each state
applies except where congressional or federal constitutional authority
governs.23I
A few areas of federal common law remain after Erie, however, such
as the federal common law of interstate pollution. In 1972, in Illinois v.
Milwaukee, the State of Illinois sued the City of Milwaukee and other
defendants alleging pollution of Lake Michigan by sewage discharge. 2
The Supreme Court held that public nuisance claims of interstate water
pollution presented federal questions and should be handled by federal
district courts.2 33
The court determined that federal common law exists that governs "air
and water in their ambient or interstate aspects. 2 34 It noted that the federal
common law of public nuisance in interstate waters may be applied despite
the existence of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).235
224 See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987) (identifying express preemption,
implied preemption, and preemption by conflict).
225 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203
(1983); see also Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491 (identifying express preemption that is explicit in the
language of the federal law, but noting preemption may also exist when there is no such explicit
language).
226 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204; Ouellette, 479 U.S. at 491-92.
227 Id. (both quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
221 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204.
229 See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
230 id.
231 Id.
232 Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
233 Id. at 107-08.
234Id. at 103.
235 Id. at 104.
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Therefore, federal common law applied, preempting state laws 236
however, the court cautioned, "The applicable federal common law
depends on the facts peculiar to the particular case. 237 The court did not
foreclose the possibility of considering state standards, especially when
such standards were stricter than the federal rules.238
Conversely, in 1981, the Supreme Court in Milwaukee v. Illinois
239
held that a federal common law remedy was not available to the state of
Illinois for the alleged discharge and inadequate treatment of sewage by
Wisconsin municipal corporations, which was alleged to threaten the
health of Illinois's citizens. 240 The court concluded that "Congress has not
left the formulation of appropriate federal standards to the courts through
application of often vague and indeterminate nuisance concepts and
maxims of equity jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field through
the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program supervised by an
expert administrative agency., 241  The court reasoned that the FWPCA
Amendments of 1972 were intended to completely rewrite existing water
pollution legislation,242 and therefore, the courts were not free to try to
improve this comprehensive scheme by applying federal common law that
imposed more stringent limitations.243 It also noted that as between state
and federal common law, one or the other should be used, but not both at
the same time.2"
Similarly, one year later in United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the District of New Jersey held that the CAA preempted
a federal common law nuisance claim seeking damages for air pollution.245
The court reasoned that the CAA addressed the issue of air pollution
because it "establishes a complete regulatory procedure whereby various
pollutants are identified, air quality standards are set, and procedures for
strict enforcement are created., 246  Echoing the Supreme Court in
Milwaukee v. Illinois, the district court emphasized that when there is a
comprehensive regulatory program monitored by an expert administrative
agency, federal common law is unnecessary and, therefore, preempted.247
236 Id. at 105.
.
3
.Id at 106.238 Id. at 107.
239 Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
24 01 d. at 309, 332.
241 Id. at 317.
242 Id
243 Id. at 319-20.
244 Id. at 313 n.7; see also Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981)
(explaining that federal law governs where state law cannot be applied, as in cases where the rights and
obligations of the sovereign are implicated, where international and interstate disputes arise, or where
there is an admiralty issue).
245 United States v. Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 699 (D.N.J. 1982).246 Id. at 702.
247 Id. (citing Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 317).
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In deciding whether the CAA preempted the federal common law of
nuisance in the air pollution context, 248 the court compared the CAA with
the FWPCA, but distinguished the CAA and concluded it "must be
evaluated on its own terms. 249  The court reasoned that "[w]hile the
FWPCA regulates every point source of water pollution, the CAA
regulates only those stationary sources of air pollution that are found to
threaten national ambient air quality standards., 250 Accordingly, the court
articulated the governing test as "whether the scope of the legislative
scheme established by Congress is such that it addresses the problem
formerly governed by federal common law."25'
In 1987, in International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,252 the Supreme Court
considered whether the CWA preempted a common law nuisance claim
filed in Vermont under Vermont law when the source of alleged injury was
in New York.253 The respondents, property owners, alleged that the
petitioner's mill constituted a nuisance by its discharge of effluents into
Lake Champlain, which diminished the value of the respondents'
property.254 The court concluded that the CWA preempted the application
of Vermont nuisance law to a New York point source. The court noted
that an affected state has only "an advisory role in regulating pollution that
originates beyond its borders" 255 and "may not establish a separate permit




The court explained that where an Act of Congress establishes a
comprehensive regulation and the matter is generally controlled by federal
law, as in the case of interstate pollution, "the only state suits that remain
available are those specifically preserved by the Act., 257 It ruled that the
CWA, and not various states' standards, should be applied to a single point
source, so that there would be no "serious interference with the
achievement of the 'full purposes and objectives of Congress.' 2 58  The
court noted that "[a] state law also is preempted if it interferes with the
methods by which the federal statute" would reach its goal.259 In this case,
24
1 Id. at 701.
249 Id.
250 Id. Prior to the 1990 Amendments, the CAA was not as comprehensive as the CWA. Harper,
supra note 37, at 682-83. After adoption of the 1990 Amendments, however, the CAA has been
considered sufficiently comprehensive to preempt federal common law nuisance claims, including
those based on emissions from stationary sources. Merrill, supra note 154, at 319.
251 Kin-Buc, Inc., 532 F. Supp. at 702. (citing Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 315 n.8).
252 Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
253 Id. at 483.
254 Id. at 484.
255 Id. at 490.
256 Id. at 491.
257 Id. at 492.
258 Id. at 493-94 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713
(1985)).
259 Id. at 494 (citing Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n, Inc., v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd.,
467 U.S. 461, 477 (1984)).
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Vermont law was preempted because it would allow the federal permit
system to be circumvented, which would upset the balance of private and
public interests reflected in the CWA.26 °
B. Conflict Preemption: The Clean Air Act
There are two possible types of preemption at issue in California v.
General Motors: conflict preemption and field preemption. Conflict
preemption potentially arises under the CAA and field preemption could
exist under EPCA.261
Conflict preemption is possible because the CAA's definition of air
pollutant has been expanded by the Supreme Court's April 2007 decision
in Massachusetts v. EPA.262 The court determined that carbon dioxide is
an "air pollutant" under the CAA.263 Therefore, the EPA is required to
regulate carbon dioxide emissions under the CAA upon a finding that they
create a risk of harm to public health or welfare. 264 Although considered
an environmental victory, the court's holding increases the difficulty of
successfully pursuing a public nuisance action for air pollution by
introducing the problem of conflict preemption. If there is conflict
preemption and, consequently, no federal common law, state law would
govern under the savings clause in § 104(e) of the CAA. 265
The Supreme Court's conclusion that carbon dioxide is a pollutant
under the CAA could now mean that the CAA preempts federal common
law public nuisance claims. In Connecticut, the plaintiffs pled for relief
under the federal common law of public nuisance or, alternatively, under
state common law. Filing the claim in the alternative is an effective
strategy to avoid the effect of possible federal preemption. If the court
finds that the CAA does preempt the federal common law public nuisance
claim, the claim can proceed under the state common law. However, if the
court determines that Massachusetts v. EPA requires a finding of
preemption because sources of carbon dioxide emissions are now regulated
under the CAA, then the CAA savings clause will keep the source state's
common law public nuisance viable.266
In California v. General Motors, on the issue of conflict preemption,
260 Id.
261 Although the automakers asserted that the CAA preempts the field of emissions, the CAA is
not as comprehensive as the CWA, as noted in Milwaukee v. Illinois, and therefore does not create a
field preemption concern regarding possible public nuisance claims. The CWA regulates all point
sources while the CAA relies on national standards that are implemented through state plans, rather
than a source-specific comprehensive permit system.
262 Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1460--61 (2007).
263 Id. at 1460.
264 Id. at 1462.
265 See infra Part IV.D. CAA § 209(a) has very narrow language, and only preempts state
standards relating to control of emissions of new vehicles. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (westlaw 2007).
266 Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,497 (1987).
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GM argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA
makes clear that the CAA completely preempts federal common law
regarding carbon dioxide as an air pollutant.267 Under the court's ruling,
GHGs are governed by the CAA, the EPA has authority to regulate GHGs
from vehicle emissions, and states have an explicit right to challenge the
EPA's decisions.268 Thus, GM argued, the CAA provides for both
regulation of carbon dioxide linked to climate change and an effective
remedy for insufficient regulation, and preempts the entire related field of
federal common law.269
In contrast, California argued that complete displacement of an area of
federal common law occurs only upon implementation of a comprehensive
long-range regulatory regime directly addressing the particular issue; the
fact that a statute covers the same general subject matter as a federal statute
is not sufficient.270 Massachusetts v. EPA highlights that the CAA
currently provides no comprehensive response, remedy, or regulation to
the specific problem of global warming, and may not develop such a plan
for several years.271
Noting that conflict preemption occurred in Milwaukee II only after an
"all-encompassing program of water pollution regulation," but not in
Milwaukee I where numerous laws merely "touched" interstate waters,
California argued that the "unexercised regulatory authority" granted to the
EPA in Massachusetts is insufficient to preempt common law.272 This
proposition is supported by the recent history in application of the CAA
regarding air pollution and ozone depletion that congressional intervention
is required before effective regulatory action is taken against interstate air
pollution.273 California concludes that "[w]hile the Massachusetts ruling
may prod the EPA to address global warming in a manner that provides the
State with a meaningful remedy for harms related to future greenhouse gas
emissions, until that comes to pass, the court must apply the federal
common law to California's claim.,
274
The automakers will likely argue that a piecemeal approach to
regulation of new vehicle emissions should be avoided at all costs. They
will likely rely on Massachusetts v. EPA to state that the Supreme Court
has mandated that the EPA act with regard to new vehicle emissions of
267 Defendants' Supplemental Brief, supra note 40, at 3.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 California's Supplemental Brief Re: Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency at 4,
California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-cv-05755-MJJ (N.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2007).
271 Id.
272 Id. (emphasis removed); California's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at 9, California v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 3:06-cv-05755-MJJ (N.D. Cal. Feb. 1,
2007).273 Merrill, supra note 154, at 318.
274 California's Supplemental Brief, supra note 270, at 5.
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carbon dioxide and that any action by the California court would only
hinder the process.
C. Field Preemption: The Energy Policy and Conservation Act
The automakers in California v. General Motors also asserted that this
public nuisance claim is preempted by EPCA.275  The defendants
contended that setting fuel economy standards is "functionally equivalent"
to the regulation of GHG emissions. 76
California rebutted this argument by asserting that increasing mileage
standards are not the sole method to address global warming.2 " Many
alternative solutions are available that do not affect fuel economy such as
alternative fuels, new technologies to capture or sequester emissions,
reduction of emissions upstream in manufacturing process, and other
278strategies. The state further asserted that EPCA was never intended to
be a comprehensive environmental or global warming statute.27 9  The
purpose of EPCA is to increase the domestic supply of petroleum, conserve
energy, and decrease the vulnerability to imports. 280 EPCA also does not
contain any civil remedy related in any way to global warming.28'
Accordingly, California claimed that while EPCA may preempt a state law
claim, the state relies on the federal common law for its remedy.
D. State Law Arguments
If the court determines that the CAA preempts California's common
law claims, then the CAA savings clause will retain the state causes of
action.282 The automakers claimed that (1) California's consent to vehicles
is a defense to public nuisance283 and that (2) the mere sale of a legal
product cannot be a public nuisance.284 The automakers further contended
that California state nuisance law only allows the state to sue for
abatement, not damages.285  These compelling arguments make
California's state law nuisance arguments weaker than its arguments based
on the federal common law of interstate nuisance.
The automakers asserted that California has expressly consented to
275 Defendants' Supplemental Brief, supra note 40, at 3-4.
276 California's Memorandum of Law, supra note 272, at 13.
.
7 Id. at 13-14.2 18 Id. at 14.
279 Id. at 13.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 14.
282 The CAA savings clause, § 104(e), preserves causes of action under state law when the CAA
preempts a state common law claim. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(e) (Westlaw 2007).
23 California's Memorandum of Law, supra note 272, at 30.284 Id.
285Id. at 31.
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have vehicles in its state and thus cannot obtain damages from any
nuisance that they create. 28 6 Therefore, California Civil Code § 3482 bars
the action unless the action is expressly authorized by state or federal
law.287 California's CARB program individually permits each new auto
for use in the state.288 California state government employs 37,000
vehicles itself, the largest fleet of any group in the state.289 California also
has a vast transportation infrastructure on which it invites and encourages
vehicles to travel.290  The state enthusiastically consents to the sale of
automobiles within its borders, and it receives vast revenue from both
motor vehicle fees and fuel taxes.291
California responded by asserting that no express authority is available
under § 3482.29 For express authority, there must be legislative
contemplation of the doing of the very act that causes the injury.2 93 The
state claimed that the law requires express consent to the particular activity
and to the particular resulting nuisance or hazard.294 California contended
that simply because a state supports a product in the marketplace does not
preclude it from seeking recovery for any harm that may be ultimately
caused.295
The automakers also asserted that California law bars the assertion of
public nuisance based on the "mere manufacture and distribution of a
product" 296 and that for liability to attach the manufacture must be engaged
in some "affirmative conduct that assisted in the creation of a hazardous
condition. 297 They further claimed that state law only allows recovery in
three specific instances-where a defendant: (1) owned or controlled
property where nuisance arose; (2) created nuisance on another's property;
298or (3) employed another to perform work that resulted in nuisance.
California rebutted this assertion by contending that the critical question is
whether the defendant created or assisted in the creation of the nuisance.299
Here, the automakers designed vehicles to discharge GHGs in a manner
286 See id. at 30.
217 Id. at 29.
288 Defendants' Notice of Motion and Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint for Lack of
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May be Granted at 20,
California v. Gen. Motors, Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ (N.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2006) [hereinafter
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss].
2191d. at 19-20.
290 California's Memorandum of Law, supra note 272, at 30.
291 id.
292 Id. at 29-30.
293 Id. at 29.294 id.
295 Id. at 30.
296 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, supra note 288, at 25.
297 Id. (citing County of Santa Clara v. Atl. Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 328 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006)).
298 Id.
299 California's Memorandum of Law, supra note 272, at 30-31.
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that creates a nuisance, and the automakers knew or should have known of
the emissions and their impacts.300
V. CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS AS PUBLIC NUISANCE:
AN UNREASONABLE EXPANSION OF PUBLIC NUISANCE THEORY?
This part of the Article considers four arguments that oppose the
theory underlying public nuisance claims in the climate change context. In
response to each argument, it then presents a multi-faceted endorsement of
the state's theory of the case in California v. General Motors. It explains
how California's approach is a well-grounded legal theory that avoids
political question and preemption obstacles while advancing the laudable
objectives of promoting climate change regulation and authorizing
recovery from its impacts. Part V also illustrates how the state's theory in
California v. General Motors is a logical extension of the existing federal
common law of interstate air pollution.
There are four categories of arguments that oppose the state's
prospects for recovery in the California v. General Motors case: (1)
judicial competence and efficiency; (2) interpretation of the CAA and
federal common law; (3) fairness; and (4) improper expansion of public
nuisance doctrine. The four opposing arguments will be presented first,
followed by arguments supporting the state's position in California v.
General Motors.
The judicial competence argument asserts that courts are not the
appropriate body to make decisions on international policy issues like
climate change. This theory lies at the heart of the political question hurdle
for California in its case, as it did for the states in the Connecticut case. 30 ,
Courts are empowered to interpret legislation and give effect to its purpose,
which is arguably what occurred in the Massachusetts v. EPA case. In that
case, the states sought to compel EPA to do the job that Congress arguably
had assigned the agency to do. There was some ambiguity as to whether
Congress intended EPA to have the non-discretionary duty to regulate
carbon dioxide as an air pollutant. Therefore, the court was the appropriate
forum to resolve that dispute. The opponents of California's theory would
argue that California v. General Motors is distinguishable from
Massachusetts v. EPA because the California v. General Motors case
presents the potential for the judiciary to engage in a form of "legislating
from the bench" if it rules on climate change impact cases.
At best, the judiciary's involvement in California v. General Motors is
premature because an initial policy determination from Congress on
climate change regulation has not yet occurred. Such an initial policy
"0 Id. at 31.
301 See supra Part III.A.
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determination can and should take the form of domestic implementing
legislation enacted pursuant to the mandates of an international accord like
the Kyoto Protocol. In the alternative, at a minimum there would need to
be mandatory domestic legislation in place, albeit not connected to an
international law regime addressing climate change, that requires GHG
emission reductions. Only then would courts have a proper role to play in
giving effect to the congressional policy expressed in such legislation on a
highly significant national and international regulatory matter.
The other side of the judicial competence argument is the efficiency
argument, perhaps better known as the "floodgates problem." This
argument asserts that allowing a case like California v. General Motors to
proceed, even though it only seeks damages for past harms, could cause an
avalanche of subsequent unnecessary, expensive, time-consuming, and
premature climate change litigation. The automakers would assert that
meaningful help for victims of climate change impacts is on its way in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in April 2007 in Massachusetts v.
EPA. Moreover, California v. General Motors represents a form of
counterproductive impatience that interferes with this impending
congressional response to climate change via EPA's new mandate to
consider regulating carbon dioxide as a criteria pollutant under the CAA.
The Massachusetts v. EPA decision has set the wheels in motion to deliver
what California ultimately wants to protect its environment and its
citizens-a mandatory federal framework to regulate GHG emissions.
Until that time, California's efforts and resources would be more
productively devoted to state regulation of climate change-through
laudable initiatives such as California's Global Warming Solutions
Act-and by promoting technological innovation and striving to work
cooperatively with industry to address a problem that affects all citizens of
the state.
Even if the CAA and EPCA do not occupy and preempt the interstate
air pollution context to the degree that the CWA preempts interstate water
pollution cases, Congress is about to move one significant step closer to
that preemption bar with the implementation phase of the Massachusetts v.
EPA decision. The automakers would assert that it is most appropriate at
this juncture to allow Congress and the EPA to undertake the task that is
now before them-to regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant under the
CAA. When that task is complete, it is likely that the climate change area
will be comprehensively regulated in much the same way that the CWA
governs the water pollution context. Therefore, the need to rely on and
extend the interstate air pollution dimension of public nuisance into the
climate change area to attempt to fashion interim relief for climate change
impacts is premature at best, if not entirely unnecessary.
Clogging the courts with unnecessary suits such as California's public
nuisance claim also raises fairness concerns. The environmental
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movement rallied around meritorious suits in the 1970s and 1980s against
egregious polluters whose conduct posed a grave threat to the health and
welfare of citizens and to the integrity of natural resources. The
Connecticut and California v. General Motors cases, however, are entirely
different situations from these early environmental lawsuits. These public
nuisance suits are making scapegoats out of the backbone of the American
economy-the energy sector and the automobile industry-simply for
conducting their business in a way that is entirely consistent with
applicable law. Therefore, the fairness argument asserts that widespread
problems such as climate change impacts that affect the nation as a whole
must be addressed at the highest level of democracy-federal and state
government-and should not scapegoat the pillars of the economy, which
are simply a few of the many sources of the climate change problem to
which we all contribute.
Related to the fairness and scapegoating concern is the problem of
doctrinal distortion-the improper expansion of the public nuisance
doctrine into areas it was not meant to reach. Public nuisance doctrine was
not intended to become a made-to-order weapon to haul the latest "bad
guy ''3°2 into court to collect damages for an alleged public harm.
Conversely, public nuisance doctrine traditionally has "targeted how
properties or products are used, not manufactured. 3 °3  This shift away
from improper use to improper manufacture is a problem for at least two
reasons. First, it blurs the distinction between public nuisance and
products liability doctrine, which will lead to inevitable confusion for the
bench and bar, and will likely produce ambiguous and unmanageable
precedent. Second, it is an improper extension of public nuisance doctrine
because it creates an unworkable judicial standard that allows too much
discretion for judges to identify what might be unreasonable interference in
any possible context. Public nuisance doctrine is best used as a gap-filler
in environmental litigation-to articulate novel ways for courts to find a
way to provide redress for a tangible environmental harm that is not
otherwise regulated under existing statutory regimes.
California has a variety of general policy responses to these challenges
to its theory of the case in California v. General Motors. First, like all
common law principles, public nuisance doctrine needs to evolve and grow
to respond to the changing needs of our society. Desperate times call for
desperate measures. In light of the climate change crisis that has just come
to center stage in the international arena within the past ten to fifteen years,
302 The "bad guys" in this modem expansion of public nuisance litigation have been
manufacturers of unpopular products such as asbestos, guns, tobacco, lead paint, and MTBE (a gasoline
additive). Richard 0. Faulk & John S. Gray, Getting the Lead Out? The Misuse of Public Nuisance
Litigation by Public Authorities andPrivate Counsel, 21 ToxicS L. REP. 1172, 1176 (2006).
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there is a need for heroic litigation to go beyond the bounds of traditional
doctrine and try to promote public good through creative use of common
law theories like public nuisance. Traditional federal and state legislative
responses are important, but those processes move very slowly and do not
always offer meaningful recourse for the impacts in our backyards.
Second, regarding fairness, the doctrine of joint and several liability in tort
law permits a plaintiff to sue any individual for part of a harm that the
plaintiff suffered and recover from that responsible party some or all of the
damages to which the plaintiff is entitled. Third, the downfall of the
tobacco industry did not occur because affected Americans waited for
federal regulatory action. Rather, it came from creative and ambitious
plaintiffs' lawyers that crafted a viable legal theory to promote public
welfare by seeking damages for harm to individual victims.3°4 It was an
important step in the right direction that later contributed to meaningful
legislative responses. The California v. General Motors case can offer a
similar positive step in the fight against the causes and effects of climate
change.
There are two significant obstacles that could prevent California from
prevailing in an appeal of the California v. General Motors case: (1) the
political question doctrine, and (2) preemption. The state's theory of the
case overcomes both of these hurdles for the reasons that follow.
The litigation strategy to pursue damages rather than injunctive relief
is likely a successful approach to avoid the political question doctrine
concerns raised in the Connecticut case. Courts are empowered to decide
tort cases, and only need to find unreasonable harm to award damages.
The state is not seeking a comprehensive solution to climate change in
seeking damages in this public nuisance claim. Even California's
ambitious Global Warming Solutions Act does not purport to solve the
world's--or even the nation's--climate change crisis.
Consistent with the court's reasoning in Barasich, recovery of
damages does not constitute a policy determination; it is merely an
application of public nuisance law to the facts. In Connecticut, seeking
injunctive relief would have required the court to determine standards
without an initial policy finding. Without guidance from Congress or the
EPA, the court would be arbitrarily stopping future action. However, by
awarding monetary damages for past harms, the court in California v.
General Motors would be fulfilling one of its primary functions-to
provide monetary awards to those who are harmed. The legal framework
for adjudicating public nuisance claims is well established. Courts have
been deciding cases applying the federal common law of public nuisance
304 Stephen Susman, Esq., Address at BNA Environment Health and Safety Audio Conference:
Panacea or Placebo: Using Public Nuisance Principles to Redress Environmental Harms (Feb. 27,
2007) (on file with author).
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since Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co. Under the federal common law of
public nuisance, the court must only decide whether there has been an
unreasonable harm to the state of California. Once the court determines
that the harm is unreasonable, it may award damages as courts routinely do
on a day-to-day basis.
In addition, the relief sought in California v. General Motors is more
narrowly tailored than the relief sought in Connecticut. Connecticut was
brought on behalf of citizens of several different states scattered
throughout the United States.30 5 Unlike the Defendants in Connecticut, all
of the auto manufacturers in California v. General Motors do business or
are registered entities in the State of California. This is a critical
distinction because one of the issues that several of the defendants in the
Connecticut case asserted was that they were not present in any of the
plaintiff states and that the states were attempting to hold them liable for
their contributions to the "public nuisance" of global climate change even
though these contributions occurred outside of the states that were bringing
suit.
30 6
With respect to preemption in light of Massachusetts v. EPA,
California has a viable response. Massachusetts v. EPA addresses new
emission standards and arguably could preempt public nuisance suits for
climate change impacts once those new emission standards are in place.
California's case, however, merely seeks to recover damages for past
harms from climate change impacts. The court must only find
unreasonable harm and apply the law to the facts. In addition, there is a
difference between addressing the causes as distinguished from the effects
of climate change. The CAA does not expressly preempt tort actions.
Therefore, such tort actions to address recovery for the effects of climate
change may be viable even after the Massachusetts v. EPA decision's
amended statutory framework for the CAA is implemented.
Although a legal issue like climate change regulation may be
politically charged, it does not necessarily create a political question. The
UNFCC is the only climate change treaty to which the United States is a
party; however, this framework treaty does not require any mandatory
reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The United States has expressly
declined to become a party to the UNFCC's Kyoto Protocol, which
imposes mandatory targets and timetables for GHG emissions reductions.
All current acts of Congress dealing with climate change focus on research
and voluntary compliance. There are currently no Executive agreements
dealing with climate change.
The cases involving interstate air pollution discussed in Part I of this
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Article also support the validity of California's position. First, federal
common law should govern this case because climate change impacts
experienced in California are the result of interstate air pollution from
GHG emissions throughout the United States and beyond U.S. borders.
Therefore, the concern addressed in National Audubon Society v.
Department of Water (Mono Lake case) that an interstate dispute was not
at issue is not a problem in California v. General Motors. The dispute in
the Mono Lake was an exclusively intrastate matter, whereas climate
change is a quintessential form of interstate pollution.
California v. General Motors is also distinguishable from two
interstate air pollution cases under the CAA that concluded that the CAA
preempted federal common law claims. Although the Supreme Court in
Washington v. General Motors did not exercise its original jurisdiction to
hear the interstate air pollution case, the court noted that air pollution was
"one of the most notorious types of public nuisance ' 307 and that air
pollution remedies "necessarily must be considered in the context of
localized situations as geographical characteristics are important in abating
air pollution. 30 8 This language reinforces the state's theory in California v.
GM. The impacts are localized in California and not dispersed throughout
18 states as in Washington v. General Motors. Moreover, unlike in New
England Legal Foundation v. Costle, there is no express approval from
EPA at issue in this case to assert that the CAA preempts the application of
federal common law. Taken together, these two cases on their face appear
to limit the viability of federal common law claims for interstate air
pollution; however, the holdings are limited to the narrow factual contexts
in both cases. Therefore, the window of opportunity for future public
nuisance claims asserting federal common law recovery for interstate air
pollution has been left at least partially open for such claims to avoid CAA
preemption.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal common law of interstate pollution has been a
controversial and politically charged topic in the American legal system for
more than a century. Dating back to the landmark case of Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper Co., states have a long history of suing neighboring
states to recover for pollution originating beyond state borders. Early
Supreme Court decisions reflected the Court's concern about plaintiffs
asserting public nuisance claims to resolve interstate pollution cases in the
judicial system. The concern was grounded in the Court's understanding
that the judiciary was not the proper forum for interstate pollution disputes
307 Washington v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 114 (1972).
308 Id. at 114-16.
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and that such disputes were better resolved through interstate negotiation
or federal statutory mandate. With the advent of federal environmental
legislation like the CAA and the CWA in the 1970s, preemption concerns
made the application of public nuisance claims even more problematic
because, in most cases, the federal statutory scheme should govern the
dispute.
However, California's public nuisance suit against the auto
manufacturers should not be plagued by these concerns because (1) it
involves intrastate impacts from climate change in California; (2) the claim
triggers application of the federal common law through allegations of
interstate pollution; (3) the CAA does not yet preempt public nuisance
claims for climate change impacts because it lacks a climate change
regulatory scheme and Congress is not likely to implement one in the
immediate future; and (4) California seeks a judicially manageable
remedy--damages for past harms-rather than injunctive relief to set
future compliance standards.
If California succeeds on appeal in its public nuisance claim, it would
provide a strong impetus for the federal government to implement a
mandatory GHG emission reduction program as quickly as possible. Even
if California's claim is unsuccessful, it would be yet another powerful tool,
in addition to other types of climate change litigation and regional, state,
and local climate change regulatory initiatives, to call attention to the need
for aggressive climate regulation.30 9 Even with positive steps forward like
the California Global Warming Solutions Act and the victory in
Massachusetts v. EPA, harms from climate change impacts have occurred
and will continue to occur as the United States moves closer to a
comprehensive federal regulatory system for GHG emissions reductions.
309 See Harper, supra note 37, at 696-97 (noting that the response to such climate change
litigation could goad members of the regulated community to self-regulate their GHG emissions in
anticipation of future mandatory GHG regulation); see also Pawa & Krass, supra note 154, at 420-21
(noting that in the wake of the Connecticut case, one of the defendants announced support for
regulation of carbon dioxide emissions, another announced it would build a clean coal plant that could
capture and sequester carbon dioxide emissions, and a third joined the Plains Carbon Dioxide
Reduction Partnership to further investigate various strategies to reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the
atmosphere).
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